THURSDAY, MAY 9, 1968
In the morning, A/3-39th conducted recon patrols around the battalion field
CP, but made no contact.  The attached Scout Platoon, HHC/2-47th Mech, did
the same and came under sniper fire; the platoon reported 1 US WIA at 2:50 PM.

Meanwhile, B/3-39th was moving out to the southwest in pursuit of the enemy
that had attacked the Battalion Field CP.  The company came under sniper fire
three times between 7 AM and 2 PM, but reported no casualties.  At 2:30 PM,
B/3-39th made contact a kilometer southwest of the Y-Bridge and a kilometer
east of Xom Cau Mai.  Enemy fire "fluctuat[ed] between heavy to sporadic,"
noted a brigade after-action report, as the enemy positions were pounded with
gunships, artillery, and air strikes.
    At 3:20 PM, BG Roseborough, ADC, 9th Div, overflew the contact area and
reported seeing twenty sampans about three klicks east of 3-39th.  "Appears
to be transportation of VC in contact area," noted the brigade log.  "Request
made by Action 3 [brigade S3] to have Dutch Master (7-1 Cav) insert elements
in area."
    At 4:15 PM, B/3-39th reported 1 US KIA.  Contact was broken at 5 PM.

Meanwhile, B/6-31st was placed opcon to the 3-39th to support B/3-39th, and
set up a block southwest of the contact.  The attached company came under
sniper fire at 4:05 and reported 6 US WIA; it had an additional 3 US WIA
during the day.

During the day, 62 enemy bodies were reported being found in the 3-39th area,
ten by A/3-39th, twelve by B/3-39th, ten by B/6-31st, and thirty by
supporting gunships.

At 5:15 PM, a police station in the battalion area reported being mortared.
In response, the Scout Platoon, HHC/2-47th Mech moved to the police station,
while A/3-39th swept clockwise around the station and B/6-31st swept
counter-clockwise.  The two companies linked up at the police station,
apparently without making contact with the enemy.

Sometime during the day, William Tuohy, a correspondent with the LOS ANGELES
TIMES visted LTC DeLuca's command post in the pagoda below the Y-Bridge.
"Reaching the command post means a long sprint down the far end of the
bridge, leaping the barbed wire at the end, and making another dash over an
open field," wrote Tuohy.  The reporter was talking with MAJ Booras, the
battalion operations officer, when a sniper opened fire on the pagoda.  One
bullet hit a wall inside the pagoda.  "The sniper is spotted on the top floor
of a house about 150 yards away, and the soldiers open up with a loud
fusillade."
    "Then the radio crackles:  'We've just had a trooper up here on the
brigde take a stomach wound.  Requent medical evacuation.'"
    "Booras is on the radio to the circling helicopters:  'One dustoff for
one stomach wound, litter, U.S. urgent.'  The helicopter hovers and the
wounded soldier, his bare chest bloody, sweaty and dirty is brought in.
'Hold off that chopper till we get some blood in him,' says Booras. . . ."
Tuohy notes that "As the wounded trooper is evacuated, the commanding general
of the 9th Division, Maj. Gen. Julian J. Ewell . . . arrives by helicopter.
'No sweat,' he says.  'We ought to be able to clean this area up by tonight.'"
    The general's grizzled sergeant major, Raymond Guertin, 45, of Hicks,
La., a combat veteran of Vietnam, Korea and Normandy, says, 'Man, this
reminds me of World War II.  It's house-to-house fighting with command posts
in churches instead of bunkers or paddies.'"
    MG Ewell soon departs.  Tuohy's story continues:  "'That's the problem
with this kind of fighting,' says De Luca during a break.  'They [the enemy]
have the advantage by positioning themselves in houses and shooting at us.
They don't care about the civilians.  But we don't want to destroy the city
or hurt the civilians, so it is necessarily a slow process.'"

The Battalion Field CP again spent the night at the southern approach to the
Y-Bridge with the battalion reconnaissance platoon, B/3-39th, and the Scout
Platoon, HHC/2-47th Mech; A/3-39th was positioned immediately to the west
along the Kinh Doi Canal.  The attached B/6-31st was positioned about a
kilometer to the east.

Meanwhile, C/3-39th was opcon to the 4-39th, and conducted operations with
C/4-39th in the vicinity of Route 230 at a point nine kilometers south of the
Kinh Doi Canal.  C/3-39th and C/4-39th made contact with an estimated enemy
company, and called in artillery, gunships, and air strikes; the two
companies reported 2 US WIA and a body count of 34 VC.
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